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Abstract
The governance challenges facing the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are not simply limited
to representation and voice, and the associated question of quota allocation. The author identiﬁes
governance issues that hitherto remained largely ignored by the literature and policy-makers alike.
Speciﬁcally, he examines the governance issues that arise when (i) one or more shareholders hold
controlling voting blocks, and (ii) principal-agent problems exist between the Executive Board
and the Managing Director. Furthermore, these typical governance issues are compounded by the
speciﬁc characteristics of IMF governance, such as consensus decision making, the lack of clear
ﬁduciary duty on the part of the Executive Board, and the lack of separation between the
Executive Board and the Managing Director. The author then attempts to quantify the extent to
which the IMF’s governance structure deviates from corporate best practice. Unsurprisingly, he
ﬁnds that the IMF does not follow best practice. The author offers several proposals for
governance reforms, including that the IMF should implement a form of “constrained discretion.”
Under this framework, the Executive Board would set the objectives and rules for the IMF on an
annual basis. The Managing Director and the staff would be free to pursue these objectives,
conditional on the rules. These respective reforms would improve accountability and hence the
legitimacy of the IMF.
JEL classiﬁcation: F3
Bank classiﬁcation: International topics
Résumé
Les problèmes de gouvernance du Fonds monétaire international (FMI) ne touchent pas
uniquement la question de la représentation et des voix des pays membres ou le dossier afférent de
la répartition des quotes-parts. L’auteur souligne en premier lieu l’importance de dimensions
restées jusqu’ici largement ignorées des chercheurs comme des décideurs publics. Il s’intéresse en
particulier aux problèmes découlant de la présence (i) d’un ou de plusieurs actionnaires
dominants et (ii) de l’existence de conﬂits d’intérêts du type mandant-mandataire entre le Conseil
d’administration et le directeur général. En outre, il estime que ces problèmes classiques de
gouvernance sont aggravés par certaines caractéristiques du mode de gestion du FMI, notamment
par la prise de décision consensuelle, par le fait que l’obligation ﬁduciaire du Conseil
d’administration soit équivoque et par l’absence de démarcation entre le mandat de ce même
Conseil et celui du directeur général. L’auteur tente dans un second temps de mesurer les
divergences qui séparent la structure de gouvernance du FMI du modèle prôné par les entreprises.vi
Bien entendu, les données lui conﬁrment que le FMI ne suit pas des pratiques optimales de
gouvernance. L’auteur avance quelques pistes de réforme, en souhaitant par exemple voir
instaurer au sein du FMI une forme d’encadrement du pouvoir discrétionnaire du directeur
général. Dans ce cadre, le Conseil d’administration ﬁxerait les objectifs et les règles de
l’institution pour l’année. Le directeur général et son personnel auraient la latitude voulue pour
poursuivre les objectifs énoncés, mais dans le respect des règles. Les réformes renforceraient la
responsabilité du FMI et accroîtraient d’autant sa légitimité.
Classiﬁcation JEL : F3
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Questions internationales 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The ongoing Strategic Review of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) should provide 
the opportunity to assess the IMF’s role, functions, and governance.
1  However, despite 
the apparently strong interest in the Strategic Review process by the IMF, G-7, G-20, and 
other interested groups, little actual reform has been proposed.  In fact, most of the 
official discourse maintains that the IMF is still the key instrument to promote global 
financial stability, and that its role as a centre of multilateral coordination, surveillance, 
advice, and as a provider of  temporary  finance,  should continue largely unchanged.
2   
Similarly, while admitting that some governance issues exist, particularly in the context 
of Argentina, the assessment of IMF governance is surprisingly sanguine (De Rato 2006).  
Most discussions focus on the question of quota allocations, and generally ignore 
reference to the equally important governance question of how decisions are made.  
Overall, the current state of the IMF Strategic Review is that the IMF should simply 
continue to do what it does,  and in fact suggests an even greater role in terms of 
surveillance, lending, and its involvement in low-income countries (Truman 2006).
3   
 
The Strategic Review does not sufficiently acknowledge the fundamental changes that 
have occurred since the IMF’s inception in 1944.  The IMF no longer operates in a world 
characterized by fixed exchange rates, low levels of international capital flows, and 
limited financial sector development, and consequently, the IMF is no longer a provider 
of temporary finance to offset temporary balance-of-payments problems to its members, 
any of whom could be on either side of the balance sheet.  Rather, the IMF now operates 
in a world of flexible exchange rates  and highly integrated and sophisticated global 
capital markets, and has subsequently become a long-term lender to a group of serial 
borrowers.  This evolution has coincided with the emergence of a distinct group of IMF 
creditors (developed countries) and  IMF  borrowers (emerging-market and developing 
countries), and countries that have flexible exchange rates and those that have fixed 
exchange rates, respectively.
4   
 
While the environment in which the IMF operates, the pattern of IMF lending, and the 
characteristics of its borrowers have evolved dramatically since the 1970s, the IMF’s 
governance structure has remained static.  The governance challenges facing the IMF are 
not simply limited to representation and voice, and the associated question of quota 
allocation; rather, this paper identifies governance issues that hitherto remained largely 
ignored by the literature and policy-makers alike.  Specifically, I examine the internal 
                                                 
1 The Strategic Review was initiated in 2005 in order to examine the objective, role, and operations of the 
IMF.  See IMF (2005) for a brief description of the mandate of the review. 
2 Recent speeches by Mervyn King (Bank of England), and Tiff Macklem and David Dodge (Bank of 
Canada), are notable exceptions. 
3 The IMF would actually expand its activity with respect to its involvement in low-income countries, 
surveillance, and crisis resolution. 
4 Moreover, the creditworthiness of the typical borrower has deteriorated over time, and this development, 
in combination with the longer lending terms, has potentially serious implications for the IMF’s balance 
sheet.  The implementation of a simple model of expected credit loss suggests that the IMF is bearing a 
greater degree of risk than before (Felushko and Santor 2006).  
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governance of the IMF: the structure and process of how decisions are made.  First, I 
identify the governance issues that arise when one or more shareholders hold controlling 
voting blocks.  In particular, the existence of controlling block shareholders may lead to 
suboptimal governance outcomes, since the objectives and interests of the controlling 
shareholders may not necessarily reflect the global interests of all shareholders.  Second, 
I examine how  governance is further complicated by the potential principal-agent 
problems between the Executive Board and the Managing Director.  Since the Executive 
Board is not homogeneous in its objectives, it is often difficult for the Managing Director 
to interpret the overall mandate of the Board.  Consequently, the Managing Director may 
pursue the objectives of only a subset of the membership, or alternatively, his or her own 
initiatives.  In either case, the Managing Director may often pursue policies and actions 
that are not socially optimal.  Third, I explore why these typical governance issues are 
compounded by the specific characteristics  of  IMF governance, such as consensus 
decision making, the lack of clear fiduciary duty on the part of the Executive Board, and 
the lack of separation between the Executive Board and the Managing Director.  
Consequently, these features of IMF governance contribute to a lack of accountability for 
IMF decision making.  Using a framework drawn from corporate finance, I attempt to 
quantify objectively the extent to which the IMF’s governance structure deviates from 
corporate best practice.  Unsurprisingly, I find that the IMF does not follow best practice. 
 
Despite the apparent prevalence of these governance challenges, few of these concerns 
have been addressed within the current Strategic Review process.  And unsurprisingly, 
specific governance reforms in the past have been few and  far between.   The 
consequences of inaction are potentially severe and are to some extent already  being 
realized.   Many members feel that the decision-making process at the IMF continues to 
appear to be unduly influenced by its controlling shareholder(s), and that decisions are 
often driven more by political considerations than  by  sound economic analysis.  
Consequently, the IMF has begun to lose its credibility.  This loss of credibility could 
potentially lead to  an environment  where some members begin questioning their 
continued active participation in the IMF. 
 
Failure to reform the internal governance structure of the IMF would also affect many of 
the current proposals for its future role  that critically depend on  it  being seen  as  a 
politically independent institution.  For instance, the current  environment of global 
imbalances has prompted many to argue that the IMF should be more actively engaged in 
multilateral surveillance (King 2006 and Dodge 2006).  A key element of this proposal is 
the notion that the IMF will be an impartial and unbiased “umpire” of the international 
monetary system, ready to engage in “ruthless truth telling” to its members with respect 
to their exchange rate, fiscal, and monetary policies.  The ability of the IMF to engage in 
a  meaningful  multilateral surveillance role would be compromised, however,  if its 
governance structure did not allow for independent,  and  therefore non-politicized, 
analysis.  More generally, any future reforms of the IMF, and its subsequent ability to be 
a truly  effective  international institution, will be meaningful  only  if  its  internal 
governance structure is appropriately constituted.  That is, irrespective of the current and 
future roles of the IMF, can governance reforms be identified that will contribute to its 
effective functioning?  Given that the IMF’s mandate has changed dramatically  
  3 
throughout its history, and will most likely continue to do so in the future, it is critical 
that the governance structure of the Fund be appropriately constituted.  That is, decision 
making at the Fund should accord with corporate governance best practice: it should be 
transparent, accountable, and legitimate. 
 
In light of these governance challenges, and their importance to the future of the IMF, I 
offer several  proposals for  governance reforms.  The underlying principles of these 
reforms draw on  concepts  that  are  fundamental to  modern  central banking: clear 
objectives, transparency,  accountability, and legitimacy.  These principles  can  be 
operationalized at the  IMF  through the  implementation of “constrained discretion.”  
Under this framework,  the Executive Board would be non-resident, charged with the 
responsibility to set the objectives and operational constraints for the  IMF.
5  The 
Managing Director and the staff would be free to pursue these objectives, conditional on 
the constraints.  The Executive Board would therefore be removed from the day-to-day 
running of the IMF and would meet (on a quarterly basis) only to review the performance 
of the Managing Director and the staff.  This would allow the Executive Board to focus 
on more strategic elements of IMF governance.
6  Importantly, consensus decision making 
would be replaced with up/down voting, and other governance features that would help to 
ensure that agents internalize the costs (and benefits) of their decisions.  In this way, 
these  reforms would allow for  the determination of clear objectives,  greater 
accountability, transparency, and ultimately, legitimacy, thus leading to a more effective 
IMF.   
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 briefly highlights the objectives of the IMF, 
and how these have changed since its inception, and section 3 describes the governance 
structure of the IMF.  Section 4 then outlines the decision-making processes of the IMF 
and the potential governance failures that could occur.  Section 5 quantifies the extent of 
these governance failures in terms of “corporate best practice.” Section 6 then posits the 
potential consequences of failing to address these governance issues, and section 7 offers 
suggestions for governance reform.  Section 8 concludes. 
 
2.  Objectives of the IMF 
 
The evaluation of the IMF’s governance structure naturally requires an assessment of its 
objectives in order to determine whether its governance structure is  appropriately 
constituted.  The objective of the IMF appears straightforward: the IMF seeks to provide 
a key public good through the promotion of international financial stability.  Specifically, 
the IMF was created to spread the risks associated with idiosyncratic (temporary) shocks 
to members’ balance of payments through short-term revolving credits, which 
encouraged members to eschew policies that might be  destructive of national and 
international prosperity.  Operationally, the IMF would provide temporary assistance to 
                                                 
5 The constraints could include, for example, strict access limits, or ensure candid surveillance advice. 
6 The reallocation of responsibilities would also facilitate the existence of a non-resident Board, and would 
increase the degree of independence.  
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finance temporary shocks to its members; IMF members could be on either side of the 
balance sheet as either a lender or a borrower.  The ability to provide temporary 
assistance naturally relied on the  IMF’s crucial role in  surveillance: the timely 
recognition and assessment of evolving conditions in the respective countries’ 
economies, and the global economy as a whole.  In this way, the IMF is an institution that 
exists to mitigate and manage risk among its members for their mutual benefit.   
 
The functioning of the IMF, as witnessed in the 1960s, was broadly consistent with the 
precepts set out above.  In response to balance-of-payments crises, industrial countries 
often found themselves on either the creditor or debtor side of the balance sheet, and in 
terms of the latter, for only a short period of time.  For instance, during the 1960s, 
Canada, France, Spain, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom all borrowed 
from the IMF, for terms of one to six years. The subsequent collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system, however, dramatically changed the environment in which the IMF 
operated.  The industrial countries that were once on either side of the balance sheet 
became permanent creditors by the late 1980s.  With the advent of flexible exchange rate 
regimes, well-managed macroeconomic policies, and the development of capital markets 
– and their ability to have continual access to these markets, even in times of crisis – 
industrialized countries no longer needed to access IMF resources. 
 
At the same time, a shift in IMF lending practices occurred in response to the Latin 
American debt crises of the 1980s.  In addition to offering short-term loans to mitigate 
the consequences of balance-of-payments crises, the IMF offered longer-term loans in 
order to facilitate structural adjustment and, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
systemic transformation.  A key component of this type of lending was the imposition of 
strong conditionality.  Similarly, the IMF’s response to the financial and capital account 
crises of the 1990s reinforced this trend of long-term financing, albeit unintentionally in 
the context of “exceptional access.”  Countries such as Brazil, Argentina, and Turkey 
accessed  IMF resources in even greater amounts for longer terms.  The switch to 
providing long-term finance is clearly evident in the data.  For example, the 30-odd 
borrowers who accessed the G eneral  Resource  Account in 2003 had, on average, 
obtained IMF resources for 12 of the last 15 years.  Moreover, the average sovereign 
credit quality of this group of borrowers was Ba or below.
7  Essentially, to meet the needs 
of its members, the IMF has acquired the characteristics of a development bank, in order 
to provide long-term loans to repeat borrowers with poor macroeconomic policies and 
poor sovereign credit ratings.
8  While there may be some benefits or “public goods” 
associated with this development, this is clearly not the IMF’s original mandate.  In fact, 
its mandate evolved without any parallel changes in its governance structure.   
 
The  ongoing integration of capital markets, and the  heterogeneity of  exchange rate 
regimes amongst IMF members,  has also  raised the potential importance of IMF 
                                                 
7 Countries with sovereign credit ratings of Ba or lower (B, Caa) are considered to be “speculative” grade. 
8 One could argue that if the IMF’s role is more akin to that of a development bank, then it should adopt the 
governance structure of the World Bank.  I would argue, however, that it is the governance failures of the 
IMF that have led to its current role, and that its mandate should be refocused away from development-type 
lending.  
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surveillance, especially with respect to multilateral surveillance at the systemic level in 
order to identify the negative externalities that represent risks to the international 
monetary system, and for p reventing and mitigating  financial  crises and contagion.  
However, IMF surveillance has not, generally speaking, engaged in the “ruthless truth 
telling” that would ensure that such surveillance would be effective.  Rather, the IMF is 
often caught in a conflict of interest, given that it is also lending to the same countries to 
which it i s providing  surveillance, and thus surveillance reports tend to be overly 
optimistic about such issues as debt sustainability and growth forecasts.  Similarly, the 
IMF has also been reluctant to enforce the “rules of the game” with respect to exchange 
rate surveillance.
9  For example, the special consultation mechanism that was designed to 
address instances of currency “manipulation” has not been used in over 17 years 
(Goldstein 2005), nor has it been broadened to include analysis of member country 
policies that generate significant negative externalities in the international monetary 
system.
10  Consequently, IMF surveillance over the international monetary system and its 
member countries lacks credibility, and is therefore rendered less effective, preventing 
the IMF from achieving its goal of promoting international financial stability.
11            
 
These developments raise a simple question: have the nature of IMF borrowers, the state 
of the global economy, and the objectives and implementation of IMF surveillance and 
program lending changed too radically for the governance structure that was inherited 
from the pre–Bretton Woods era?  The consequences of these trends should not be 
underestimated.  If the aims and objectives of the membership diverge too greatly, some 
members may choose to “opt-out” of the IMF.  For example, the accumulation of large 
amounts of foreign reserves would suggest that China and other East Asian countries are 
self-insuring against future crises instead of relying on the IMF (Gosselin and Parent 
2005).  Could this move to self-insure reflect the fact that these countries do not feel that 
the IMF has adequately represented their interests?   Similarly, many borrowing countries 
have opted for early repayment in order to escape the influence of the IMF (for better or 
for worse).  It is with these concerns in mind that I will assess the governance structure of 
the IMF.  
 
3.  Governance Structure of the IMF 
 
The governance structure of the IMF reflects, in many ways, the co-operative nature that 
underpinned its founding.
12   There are  five  broad categories into  which  the  IMF’s 
governance structure is organized: the Board of Governors, the Board of Executive 
Directors, the Managing Director and the staff, the Independent Evaluation Office, and 
the I nternational  Monetary and  Financial  Committee (see Figure 1).  Each will be 
described in turn.   
                                                 
9 While the IMF does not have many means to “enforce” the “rules of the game,” it can call out members 
for poor policy behaviour. 
10 Presumably there have been some instances of exchange rate “manipulation” during this time. 
11 Given the recent concern over global imbalances, there is presumably a greater need than ever before for 
effective surveillance. 
12 This descriptive section follows van Houtven (2002).  
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3.1  Board of Governors 
 
The Board of Governors is the highest decision-making body of the IMF and oversees the 
IMF’s broad policy-formation process.  The responsibilities of the Board of Governors 
include accepting new members, setting the income target of the IMF, and decisions with 
respect to quota increases.  Every member of the IMF has a Governor on the Board and 
there are currently 184 members.  Voting rights, unlike many other international bodies, 
are not based on one member–one vote.  Rather, voting power is roughly allocated on the 




3.2  Board of Executive Directors 
 
The enormous size of the Board of Governors naturally implies that most decision 
making would be delegated to the Board of Executive Directors, and the Articles of 
Agreement (IMF 2006) defers to the Executive Board all those powers not explicitly 
reserved for the Board of Governors.  Consequently, considerable power has accrued to 
the Executive Board over time.  The Executive Board initially consisted of 12 directors, 
but now totals 24 directors. Of the 24 directors, five are automatically allocated to the 
largest f ive members by quota: the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the 
United Kingdom.  China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia are also allocated one director 
exclusively.  The remaining directorships are based on country groupings, with the 
largest country often electing the director.  For example, the constituency that consists of 
Antigua and Barbuda, t he Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Dominica, Grenada, 
Ireland, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, is 
represented by the Canadian director.  The constituency must vote as a block: individual 
countries within the group cannot vote differently.  The Executive Board sits in 
“continuous session” and its primary function is to approve and/or initiate the policy 
actions of the Managing Director and the staff.   
 
3.3  Managing Director and Staff 
 
The Managing Director and the staff of the IMF play the primary role in formulating and 
implementing the policies of the IMF.  The Managing Director manages the day-to-day 
operations of the IMF based upon the recommendations and advice provided by the staff.  
The Managing Director also plays an important role in guiding the IMF, by setting the 
                                                 
13 Quota is tied to economic size, openness, and the volatility of exports, and determines the voting power, 
contribution, and, to some extent, the lending access limit of member countries.  It is important to note that 
voting rights are based on actual quotas and not calculated quotas.  Calculated quotas often differ 
substantially from the actual quota allotted to each country.  Given that there is a fixed amount of quota at 
any point in time, changes to quota allotments are essentially a zero-sum game that includes political trade-
offs within the IMF’s membership.  Naturally, the United States and the other industrialized countries hold 
the majority of votes in the Board of Governors.  The United States holds roughly 17.4 per cent of the 
votes, the G-7 accounts for 46.2 per cent, and industrialized countries account for over 61 per cent of all 
votes.  
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agenda for Board of Governor meetings and summing up the Board’s discussion.  The 
Managing Director (or the Managing Director’s deputies in his  or her  absence)  also 
chairs most meetings of the Executive Board.  In this capacity, the Managing Director 
exerts considerable influence over the IMF’s policies and program implementation.  The 
Managing Director is appointed by the Board, but in practice the appointment process 
relies upon an informal arrangement among the G-7 countries: the head of the World 
Bank is American and the Managing Director of the IMF is European.   
 
The staff of the IMF works within a highly structured and hierarchic bureaucracy.  Staff 
members are on the “frontline” of surveillance and policy implementation: mission 
reports, Article IV country surveillance, research, and other operational papers form the 
basis on information used by the Executive Board (van Houtven 2002).  However, the 
structure of the I MF is such that all reports by s taff must pass through the Policy 
Development and Review Department in order to ensure that they adhere to IMF 
standards and maintain “even-handedness.”  Naturally, this process has been criticized 
for leading to homogeneity of thinking, and thus reports to the Executive Board that often 
lack the necessary frankness.  Nevertheless, the close proximity of  Executive  Board 
members to staff often allows dissenting views to be aired informally.  The staff itself, 
while technically t o be drawn from the  widest possible distribution  of its members, 
consists overwhelmingly of U.S.-trained PhDs.   
 
3.4  Independent Evaluation Office 
 
A recent addition to the IMF is the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO).  The IEO was 
created in 2000 in order to provide  independent  “arm’s-length” assessments of IMF 
program lending, policy advice, and feedback on governance issues.  The IEO has been 
very active, producing several reports that are highly critical of the IMF’s activities.
14  In 
particular, the IEO’s evaluation of the IMF’s programs in Argentina throughout the 1990s 
highlights many governance and policy failures.  While the creation of the IEO is a major 
step  forward  in  improving the governance of the  IMF, its eventual impact on future 
behaviour is still unknown. 
 
3.5  International Monetary and Financial Committee 
 
The International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) was initially known as the 
Interim Committee.  The Interim Committee was formed in 1974 to assist in the creation 
and governance of a new  international monetary system in the aftermath of the 
abandonment of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, worldwide recession, 
and the OPEC oil-price shock.  Membership consisted of the G-10 plus some emerging 
market countries.
15  The role of the Interim Committee w as to advise the Board of 
Governors on broad policy issues such as the “adaptation of the monetary and financial 
system” and “developments in global liquidity” (IMF 2004).  The IMFC meets twice a 
                                                 
14 See IEO (2003, 2004a,b) for examples of their work. 
15 The membership of the G-10 (G-7 plus Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland) also 
encompasses the countries that constitute the IMF’s backup creditors for the General Arrangements to 
Borrow (GAB).  
  8 
year and consists of individuals who are also Governors of the  IMF.
16  This usually 
means that IMFC members are ministers of finance or central bank governors.   
4.  Decision Making at the IMF 
 
There are two distinct aspects to IMF governance: voice and representation, and how 
decisions are made.  Given that many other researchers and policy-makers have already 
made proposals with respect to the former, I focus on the other distinct issue of how 
decisions are made at the IMF.  Moreover, I would argue that the governance issues 
highlighted in this section would not necessarily be mitigated even if quota reallocation 
did occur.  This section examines decision making at the level of the Board of Governors 
and the Executive Board.  Each will be considered in turn. 
 
4.1  Board of Governors 
 
The decision-making process of the Board of Governors reveals the preferences of its 
founders:  the governance of the IMF, in terms of broad policy matters, will need to 
command the broadest support of its members.  The Board of Governors meets yearly 
and votes on an up/down basis on key policy issues.  For the critical decisions, such as 
the suspension of voting rights for members that are in non-compliance with  IMF 
programs, or the process of compulsory withdrawal, supermajorities of 85 per cent are 
required.
17   
 
4.2  Board of Executive Directors 
 
The size of the Board of Governors means that most of the day-to-day governance of the 
IMF would fall to the Executive Board.  The Executive Board meets as “needed,” which 
in effect has meant an almost continuous session.  Decision making at the Executive 
Board is determined by “consensus.”  In this process, the Managing Director (or the 
deputy), who chairs the Executive Board, takes an informal “sense” of the members and 
determines whether consensus has been reached.  This standard implies that unanimity is 
required, but often a “large majority” is sufficient.  When consensus cannot be reached, 
up and down voting is conducted.  However, this rarely happens in practice.  Rather, 
members can demand that their objections be made part of the record.  In this instance, 
phrases such as “this should not constitute a precedent” or “the staff should not do this 
again” are included in the decision (van Houtven 2002). 
 
4.3  Executive Board and Managing Director: Governance Issues 
 
The relative importance of the Executive Board necessarily implies that the majority of 
my  analysis will focus on the governance issues confronting this part of the  IMF’s 
governance structure.  The process of decision making at the Executive Board level 
                                                 
16 The IMFC also allows for the deputies of the IMFC countries to meet (regularly). 
17 For more mundane IMF business, including quota reviews, the allocation of special drawing rights, and 
the size of the Executive Board, 85 per cent supermajorities are also still required, although some decisions 
need only 70 per cent majorities. The number of decisions that require supermajorities has risen over time.  
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suffers, in principle, from the standard governance issues facing most firms. First, the 
existence of a controlling shareholder(s) may lead to suboptimal governance outcomes, 
since the objectives and interests of the controlling shareholder(s) may not necessarily 
reflect the global interests of all shareholders.  Second, principal-agent problems may 
exist between the Managing Director and the Board, since the incentives of the Managing 
Director may not be aligned with the Executive Board.
18  Each will be considered in turn. 
 
(i)  Governance issues:  Controlling shareholders 
 
The first  governance issue  is that one or more major shareholder(s) may attempt to 
extract private benefits from exercising control.
19  For example, if private benefits to 
control exist, then the incentives and actions of the controlling shareholders could differ 
greatly from other shareholders.  The ability of controlling shareholders to pursue their 
interests in this instance can be furthered by the compliance of the Managing Director.
20  
Thus it is often the case that the Managing Director and the staff lack the ability to say 
“no” in the face of controlling shareholder interference in the day-to-day running of the 
IMF.  The reason for this degree of compliance may be the desire to please a major 
shareholder in order to “repay”: the Managing Director feels obliged to accommodate the 
wishes of the major shareholder(s) that appointed him or her.  Consequently, a quid pro 
quo exists that may result in policy choices that are not necessarily consistent with the 
objectives of all shareholders.  Similarly, “log-rolling” may exist between major 
shareholders, in which each member agrees to promote the other’s interest, in return for 
similar considerations in the future.   And lastly, since the duties and responsibilities of 
the Executive Board are not clearly delineated, a controlling shareholder(s) may push the 
Executive Board to undertake decisions that should be considered by the Board of 
Governors. 
 
(ii)  Principal-agent problems: Managerial discretion 
 
The second governance issue is best characterized as a principal-agent problem, in that 
the Managing Director may not undertake actions that are in the best interest of 
shareholders.  Since the Executive Board is not homogeneous in its objectives, it is often 
difficult for the Managing Director to interpret the overall mandate of the Board.  
Consequently, the Managing Director may pursue the objectives of only a subset of the 
membership, or alternatively be driven by personal  initiative.  In both cases, the 
Managing Director may also be motivated by “empire building” instincts.  For example, 
the Managing Director may desire to broaden the policy mandate of the IMF through the 
                                                 
18 The same type of principal-agent problems exist between the Board of Governors and the Managing 
Director, but this discussion will limit itself to the Executive Directors and the Managing Director.   
19 A large corporate finance literature has shown that control of a firm can be exercised when a major 
shareholder possesses as little as 10 per cent of the voting rights.  One of the primary motivations for 
holding a controlling block is that the shareholder can receive private benefits. In fact, controlling blocks 
often trade at significant premiums, suggesting that there are private benefits to holding such blocks. 
20 Evidence of this can be seen in the fact that the Managing Director and the staff have often been viewed 
as insufficiently independent in the policy process: for example, the IMF may be pushed into areas where 
they might not want to go, such as policy advice on anti-money-laundering activities.    
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provision of larger loans to more countries for longer terms.
21  Similarly, the Managing 
Director may desire to move the IMF into new areas of responsibility (such as promoting 
international trade). T he ability of  a subset  of the Executive Board to restrain the 
Managing Director, however, may be compromised by the fact that proactive reactions to 
the initiatives and actions of the Managing Director can be easily vetoed by small 
coalitions within the Executive Board.  And lastly, the lack of separation between the 
Executive Board and the Managing Director creates further governance issues, since 
many Executive Board members rely heavily on the Managing Director and staff for 
information and advice.
22     
 
4.4  Further governance challenges 
 
These typical agency problems would normally be mitigated by an effective Executive 
Board.  In the case of the IMF, however, mitigation of  the  governance challenges 
described above is complicated by several important characteristics of the IMF: 
 
(i)  The Executive Board is not independent.  Its “fiduciary duty” is not clear, 
since Executive Directors represent their respective political capitals and 
may not act in the “best interests” of all shareholders. 
 
(ii)  The Executive Board is not homogeneous.  Unlike many private sector 
boards where shareholder interests would be aligned by the profit motive, 
this is not necessarily true in the case of the IMF (Plumptre 2004).  The 
interest of developed-country Executive Directors (creditors) may differ 
substantially from that of developing-country Executive Directors (debtors). 
 
(iii)  Some IMF members possess ownership stakes that could be categorized as 
“controlling blocks,” with a divergence between ownership and control.  
That is, some Executive Directors have influence well beyond their simple 
ownership (quota) share.  This is true of the United States in particular, 
given its veto power. Consequently, the interests of some Executive 
Directors may diverge greatly from other shareholders if there are private 
benefits to exercising control.   
 
The consequence of these features of the IMF’s governance structure is that the actions of 
a “controlling shareholder,” or those of the Managing Director (in conjunction with a 
subset of the shareholders),  may not be  constrained by the Executive Board.  These 
governance issues are further compounded by the decision-making process of the IMF: 
decisions are made by consensus, and there is a lack of accountability.  The source of this 
lack of accountability, unsurprisingly, lies within the consensus model of decision 
making, and the close working relationship between the Managing Director and the 
Executive Board. 
 
                                                 
21 The IMF also suffers from a “lending” culture, wherein staff are promoted on the basis of their 
promotion of large lending programs. 
22 Moreover, the Executive Board often defers to the Managing Director’s authority.  
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4.5  Accountability and consensus decision making 
 
The consensus model of decision making at the Executive Board level, combined with 
the considerable influence of the Managing Director, blurs the lines of accountability at 
the IMF.  Simply, the need to find consensus disallows free and open voting, even when 
there are substantive disagreements among shareholders.   This inability to attribute 
responsibility to either the Managing Director or the Executive Board is compounded by 
the perception that Executive Directors themselves are not allowed to make decisions on 
an autonomous basis, but must instead reflect the directives of their political masters. 
That is, it is not clear what the fiduciary duty of the Executive Directors entails: is it to 
the political capital, or is  it  to the IMF and its entire membership?  An added 
complication is that the Managing Director can be perceived to be too pliant to the 
demands of one or more major shareholders who constitute a controlling block.  
Consequently, it is not often clear where accountability lies: with the Managing Director, 
the Executive Director of a particular country, or with the political capitals themselves.   
 
This inability to attribute responsibility for IMF actions is further complicated by the 
added layer of the Board of Governors.  Presumably, the Board of Governors oversees 
the broad policy direction of the IMF, and so responsibility may ultimately fall within its 
purview.  But the size of the Board of Governors rules out directly attributable 
responsibility to a particular set of countries.
23  Thus, where the ultimate responsibility 
lies for a particular policy decision is not directly observable, and accountability is a 
major problem.  That is, the costs of policy mistakes are not internalized by the decision 
maker. 
 
A clear example of how difficult it is to attribute program policy and outcomes is the 
occurrence of exceptional access lending.  The simple fact that the Executive Board 
approved these programs, despite the violation of its own rules, suggests that the two 
competing hypotheses cannot be identified separately.  On the one hand, a controlling 
shareholder, in conjunction with a compliant Managing Director, can engage in policies 
that do not represent the best interests of all shareholders.  On the other hand, the 
Managing Director and the staff can make managerial decisions  that  are approved 
without the necessary fiduciary oversight.   In either case, if these programs are 
ineffective or fall into arrears, the apportioning of responsibility will not be clear.  Is it 
the case that the Managing Director made an error in judgment that was approved by the 
Executive Board, or was the Executive Board w illing to extend exceptional access 
(possibly against the wishes of the Managing Director), despite the distortions its actions 
would have in markets, and the potential risks to the forward-commitment capacity and 
balance sheet of the IMF?  If it is the latter case, were the motives of the Board in the 
interest of all shareholders, or did they reflect the political interests of certain members?   
 
Without a doubt, the consensus model of decision making impugns the ability of member 
countries, and their constituencies, from attributing the consequences of IMF program 
decisions to the appropriate level of decision maker at the IMF.  The actions taken by the 
                                                 
23 In a different vein, many view this arrangement as a means for the G-7 countries, and the United States in 
particular, to control the agenda of the IMF without taking direct responsibility.    
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IMF can alternately be attributed to the Managing Director, Executive Board, and/or 
certain political capitals, and thus the costs of poor policy formation and implementation 
are not internalized.  
 
5.  IMF Governance and Corporate Best Practice 
 
The examination of the IMF’s governance structure suggests that there are several 
potential governance failures: the existence of controlling block shareholders, excessive 
managerial discretion, and a lack of accountability.  But more generally, how does the 
IMF rank in terms of corporate best practice? That is, can one quantify these governance 
failures?  The recent  spate of corporate governance scandals in  North America  and 
Europe has spawned a growing literature on the effects of corporate governance 
structures on firm-level performance.
24  The aim of these studies is to measure whether a 
corporation follows corporate “best practice.”  For example, Gompers, Ishi, and Metrick 
(2003) construct a governance index in order to measure the extent to which managers 
can maintain the status quo in the face of shareholder activism.  That is, does the 
corporation have the qualities of a democracy, where shareholder activism is possible, or 
does it have the quality of a “dictatorship,” a situation where management, or a major 
shareholder, can effectively control the institution for their own benefit? 
 
5.1  Evaluating corporate best practice 
 
In order to evaluate whether the IMF governance articles follow corporate best practice, I 
apply the methodology of Gompers, Ishi, and Metrick (2003) to the IMF’s governance 
articles.  I readily acknowledge that the use of measures of corporate governance best 
practice  may not be entirely appropriate,  since the IMF is an international financial 
institution and many of the metrics of corporate governance therefore do not have a direct 
mapping to the  IMF.  Moreover,  I recognize  that  the  IMF does not exist simply to 
maximize shareholder value, but is charged with the provision of a public good.
25  
Nevertheless, the application of these metrics of corporate governance best practice is 




The governance index of Gompers, Ishi, and Metrick categorizes provisions in a 
corporation’s governance rules that prevent shareholder activism.  The governance index 
includes 24 measures, although only a subset are applicable t o the IMF.  For each 
measure, a 1 is recorded if the provision exists, and 0 otherwise.  The measures assume 
that the existence of the provision indicates lower shareholder activism.  Therefore, the 
higher the number, the more likely  that  the firm is a “dictatorship” and not a 
                                                 
24 For instance, the Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat corporate scandals are excellent examples of how a 
lack of governance oversight led to poor performance and hence was detrimental to shareholders.  
25 This public good, presumably, would be of interest to all shareholders, and thus shareholders’ interests 
should be aligned to some extent.   
26 While the IMF is not a private corporation, I would argue that it would benefit greatly from undertaking 
many of the governances learned from its private sector counterparts.  
  13 
“democracy.”  The appendix lists the provisions that are assessed, the average percentage 
of large, publicly traded U.S. firms in 1998 that had such provisions, and whether the 
provision is relevant for the IMF.  I then determine whether the provision is in effect at 
the IMF. 
 
5.2  Summary of the governance index application to the IMF 
 
The application of the Gompers, Ishi, and Metrick measures of corporate governance 
reveals that the IMF’s governance provisions tend towards those of a “dictatorship.”  Of 
the eleven relevant provisions, the IMF scored 8.5 (see Table 1).  When the same eleven 
measures were applied to a sample of large, publicly traded firms in the United States 
between 1990 and 1998, the average score was 2.7.  This would suggest that the IMF’s 
governance structure tends to be more “dictatorial” than its private sector counterparts 
across these measures, and, consequently, that the IMF’s governance articles do not tend 
towards corporate best practice.   
 




Provision  Description  IMF score* 
Delay  Classified (staggered) 
board 
Directors are placed into different classes and 













Written consent  The need for unanimous consent  0 
 
Protection  Director indemnification 
contracts 
Directors are immune to prosecution and 




Liability  Limits on directors’ personal liability for 





Severance  Assurance of position of executives does not 











Lack of secret ballot  Confidential voting  0.5 
 
 










Directors’ duties  Provisions allow directors to consider the 
needs of constituents other than shareholders 
1 
* IMF score is from author’s calculations.  Lower score indicates better governance structure. 
 
The practical consequences of this governance structure are that it is difficult for minority 
shareholders to easily effect change at the IMF.  Rather, institutional inertia may be 
dominant.  That is, while change may occur, it would tend to be incremental and would 
represent decisions made by the controlling block shareholders and/or the Managing  
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Director.  Simply, the governance structure of the IMF is well suited to maintaining the 
status quo.
27     
 
6.  Consequences of Inaction 
 
The consequences of the IMF’s ongoing governance challenges can be fully  assessed 
only when one considers the initial conditions under which it was intended to operate.  
The IMF was conceived as a co-operative institution: member countries joined the IMF 
under the presumption that they could be either a creditor or a debtor at any point of time.  
This co-operative function was complemented by a governance structure that reflected 
such relationships.  Decision making was based on a consensus amongst a group of 
sufficiently like-type members.  Given the probability that a country could be on either 
the creditor and/or debtor side of the balance sheet, voting behaviour was aligned 
appropriately.  In this way, the IMF had the Rawlsian quality of the “veil of ignorance,” 
wherein the incentives of each member were clearly aligned due to the uncertainty 
regarding each country’s outcomes, and hence relative position within the IMF.   
 
The governance structure of such an institution would be consistent with the consensus 
model of decision making, since consensus is easy to obtain when the objectives of the 
members are similar.  Even in the presence of shareholders who held larger stakes than 
others, there is a high likelihood that the objective functions of all members would be 
aligned.  But what are the implications for the governance structure of the  IMF if 
members no longer believe that they will be on both sides of the balance sheet?   
 
The consequences for the IMF due to the changing composition of its membership are 
profound.  Whereas the co-operative contractual arrangement that was constituted in 
1944 made sense since the membership was sufficiently homogeneous, this is no longer 
the case.  Rather, if the IMF has evolved into an organization that consists of one group 
of debtors and one group of creditors, the incentives for the former will differ 
considerably from the latter.
28  Similarly, there are a group of countries with flexible 
exchange rates, and another group with fixed exchange rates.  Consequently, the 
objectives may no longer be clear, and, in fact,  the conflicting interests of the 
membership may lead to confusion over the IMF’s objectives.  This lack of clarity in the 
IMF’s objectives would only be compounded by the governance challenges of the IMF.  
For instance, a controlling block shareholder would be more likely to pursue its interests 
at the expense of others.  Similarly, the Managing Director may also claim “to know 
best” and pursue objectives that are not necessarily appropriate for all members of the 
IMF.  In either case,  the objectives of the  IMF may no longer be clear, and also 
inconsistent with the objectives of the IMF’s broader membership.  In this instance, the 
IMF’s legitimacy would be diminished in the eyes of its shareholders. 
                                                 
27 This is not to say that this is not a desirable outcome.  There could be many negative consequences from 
excessive shareholder activism for an institution such as the IMF.  Change induced by shareholders that 
occurs too frequently and idiosyncratically may not be the ideal governance model to consider. 
28 The problem arises due to the fact that the governance structure assumes that the member countries will 
be “equals.”  For instance, the Articles are very clear in the need for “uniform” treatment.  
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The  legitimacy of the  IMF  is further compromised by its governance failures.  In 
particular, if the decision-making process at the IMF continues to be unduly influenced 
by its controlling shareholder(s) and the Managing Director, and the decisions taken (for 
good or for worse) are  neither transparent nor  subject to the appropriate degree of 
accountability, then the IMF may begin to lose its credibility with its membership.  That 
is, if the members of the  IMF do not feel that the governance structure adequately 
accounts for their concerns, the IMF risks losing the support of its members.   
 
The consequences of inaction are potentially severe, and are, to some extent, already 
being realized.   The loss of legitimacy could potentially lead to an environment where 
some members begin questioning their continued active participation in the IMF, and, in 
the worst-case scenario, may consider exiting the  IMF.
29   To some extent, this may 
already be occurring.  For example, many Asian countries are self-insuring through 
reserve accumulation, rather than relying on the IMF in event of a crisis.
30  Similarly, 
Argentina and Brazil have opted for early repayment, in order to free themselves from 
IMF involvement in their domestic policy decisions.  In both cases, member countries do 
not necessarily view the IMF as legitimate or credible, and do not view access to the 
IMF’s resources as desirable. 
 
Failure to reform the internal governance structure of the IMF would also affect many of 
the current proposals for the future role of the IMF.  For instance, the current 
environment of global imbalances has prompted many to argue that the IMF should be 
more actively engaged in multilateral surveillance (King 2006, Macklem 2006, Dodge 
2006, de Rato 2006).  A key element of this proposal is the notion that the IMF would be 
an impartial and unbiased “umpire” of the international monetary system, ready to 
engage in “ruthless truth telling” to its members with respect to their  exchange rate, 
fiscal, and monetary policies.  The ability of the  IMF to fulfill the objectives of an 
enhanced multilateral surveillance role would be compromised, however, if its 
governance s tructure did not allow for  independent, and therefore non-politicized, 
analysis.  Similarly, in terms of lending, the creation of strict access limits has meaning 
only if those limits are respected by the Executive Board, and not ignored for the sake of 
political expediency.  More generally, any reforms that are instituted will be effective 
only  if the internal governance structure of the  IMF is appropriately constituted.  
Consequently, failure to address the governance challenges of the IMF could have serious 
consequences for its ability to remain an effective international organization.       
 
7.  Options for Governance Reform 
 
I acknowledge the need to consider reforms in terms of voice, representation, and other 
aspects of governance.  However, even if the quota issue is successfully resolved, the 
                                                 
29 Or, less seriously, members may not take up future quota increases, thus effectively reducing the IMF’s 
relevance.   
30 This is due to the fact that many Asian countries felt they were forced to bear too high a level of 
adjustment, relative to other IMF members who received more favourable treatment.    
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IMF still faces significant governance challenges.  In fact, I would argue that simply 
reshuffling the quota deck will do very little to resolve the governance issues raised 
earlier.  The ability of major block shareholder(s) to exercise effective control of the IMF 
will likely remain undiminished.  Similarly, the heterogeneous nature of the Executive 
Board,  the  lack of clarity in the fiduciary duty of directors, and the convention of 
consensus decision making will continue to inhibit transparency and accountability.  This 
section will therefore focus on the need for improving legitimacy, through providing a 
governance framework that will promote greater clarity of objectives, transparency, and, 
importantly, accountability.   
 
7.1  The principles of modern central banking and constrained discretion 
 
The organizing principles of governance reform can be drawn from the lessons learned 
from central banking.  Specifically, modern central banking has emphasized that policy 
success depends on having clear objectives, coupled with transparency and 
accountability.  In order to introduce clearer objectives, greater transparency, and 
accountability, I propose to introduce a modified form of constrained discretion at the 
IMF.  
 
The notion of constrained discretion as an organizing principle for the IMF should be 
considered.  Constrained discretion has successfully formed t he foundation for the 
inflation-targeting policy framework of central banks in several countries, including 
Canada, England, and New Zealand.  The idea behind constrained discretion is that the 
policy objective of the central bank is set out clearly in advance, and the central bank is 
then free to use its instruments to achieve that goal.  The key is that in pursuing the 
objective, the central bank must follow policies that are time consistent: large policy 
deviations are discouraged, since they would not be compatible with the stated objective.  
One of the benefits of constrained discretion is that it encourages the appropriate level of 
transparency.  At the same time, it allows for greater clarity in attributing accountability, 
since the objectives, constraints, and instruments of the central bank are clear.  Some 
critics of this approach argue that constrained discretion implies a set of rules that, in 
some instances, may be too simple for the environment in which the central bank 
operates.  However, constrained discretion does not necessarily imply such strict and 
simple rules: rather, there is still room for the central bank to respond to unanticipated 
shocks in the short term, so long as the longer-term objectives are met.  But, ultimately, 
discretion is constrained by the fact that, in the medium term, the central bank must 
achieve its objective. 
 
Constrained discretion could be instituted in the case of the  IMF as follows. The 
Executive Board would clearly set the objectives and rules of the IMF.  The objectives 
would include promoting international financial stability, while the rules would describe 
the modalities of multilateral surveillance, lending, and policy advice.  Then, given the 
rules, the Managing Director would be free to pursue the objectives.  A necessary part of 
this framework is that there must be a clear separation of the roles of the Managing 
Director and the Executive Board, in order to ensure transparency and accountability.  
The details of this constrained-discretion governance structure are considered below.  
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7.2  Separation of the Managing Director and the Executive Board  
 
The central governance challenge confronting the IMF is the issue of transparency and 
accountability. At its heart is the need to be able to delineate where responsibility lies for 
a given program or policy outcome.  To this end, several reforms can be considered.   
First, a greater delineation needs to be made between the Managing Director and the 
Executive Board, since the degree of interaction between them should be curtailed.  A 
simple solution is to create a non-resident Board and to reduce the number of Executive 
Board meetings from the current “continuous” session to only a few times a year (perhaps 
quarterly meetings).  Under this framework, the Executive Board would no longer be 
responsible for the day-to-day running of the IMF; rather, it would be responsible for the 
overall strategic direction and the constraints (or most likely just to review and/or enforce 
the existing limits)  under which the Managing Director could operate.  Second, t o 
improve transparency and accountability, decision making at the Executive Board level 
would no longer be made by consensus; rather, all decisions would be subject to up/down 
voting.  Thus, the Executive Directors would be accountable for the decisions made by 
the Executive Board.  Importantly, the minutes of the Board meeting and the  voting 
results would no longer be held secret for many years.  Instead, Board minutes and voting 
records would be available almost immediately, much like FOMC meetings. 
 
Lastly, i n order to achieve better governance outcomes,  the fiduciary duty of the 
Executive Directors must also be clearly defined.  Executive Directors should exhibit 
greater autonomy and place  more  emphasis on  the  objectives of the  IMF as an 
independent  international financial institution.  In this way, the Executive Directors 
would be responsible for achieving the interests of all shareholders, not just the narrow 
interests of their political sponsor.    This fiduciary duty includes: maintaining the 
independence  of  the economic analysis that forms the  foundation of  surveillance, 
ensuring that access limits are obeyed, and that greater weight is placed on assessing 
threats to the balance sheet, and hence the financial integrity of the IMF. 
 
7.3  The implementation of constrained discretion 
 
Under constrained discretion, the Executive Board would set out the objectives of the 
IMF, and determine the appropriate set of instruments and rules.  First, the Executive 
Board would set the objectives of the IMF.  In this case, the IMF’s objective would be to 
promote a market-based international financial system.
31  Then it would set out the 
instruments to be used to achieve this goal: multilateral surveillance, coupled with policy 
advice, and, in some limited cases, lending.  Given the objectives and the instruments, it 
would then set out the rules.  For instance, strict rules could be placed on the conduct of 
surveillance: the IMF would be obliged to report the findings of the staff and Managing 
Director, thereby ensuring that the analysis was not subject to political manipulation from 
the various constituents of the Executive Board.   In this way, the IMF could engage in 
the “ruthless truth telling” that is required in order to make surveillance effective.  
Similarly,  in terms of the  lending, the Executive Board would clearly delineate an 
                                                 
31 In my view, the promotion of a “market-based international financial system” would be consistent with 
the Articles of Agreement.  
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appropriate set of country-specific access limits that are tied to quota (as opposed to the 
current proposal for a precautionary lending instrument, which leaves considerable 
discretion for the allocation of additional resources to the borrowing country upon 
“review”).
32  The aim of these limits would be to reduce the degree of discretion that can 
be exercised by the Managing Director.
33  Part of this process would include separate and 
independent assessments of the access limits by the heads of the Geographic, Finance, 
and Policy  Development and Review departments (as recommended by t he G -10 
Working Group on IMF Finances).     
 
In order to place further discipline on IMF lending, credit access limits could also be 
implemented in conjunction with risk-based credit-loss measures.
 34  While the IMF holds 
precautionary balances on its balance sheet, it does not formally assess the risk against 
which these balances are held: the level of precautionary balances is set in an ad hoc 
manner.  Instead, the IMF should utilize risk-based credit-loss measures, and the level of 
precautionary balances should be linked to these measures.  There are two benefits to this 
approach: first, it would help to constrain managerial and Executive Board discretion; 
and second, it would help to ensure the integrity of the IMF’s balance sheet.  Setting 
limits on the level of credit risk would prevent overlending to poor credit risks.
35  The 
strict application of access limits should also help to mitigate moral hazard problems 
since country authorities and private investors would know, ex ante, the upper bound on 
IMF intervention.   
 
The benefit of these rules is that it would dramatically improve accountability—it would 
be clear if the rules were being broken, and by whom.  These constraints would also 
allow for a better assessment of managerial performance: simply, it would be easy to 
determine whether the Managing Director  and/or Executive Board were violating the 
                                                 
32 In this case, quota will be determined by either calculated quota or a new quota formula that accurately 
assesses a member’s economic importance, openness, etc. 
33 However, the IMF could still retain the ability to exceed access limits in highly unusual circumstances.  
Under this mechanism (and it would rarely be appropriate to invoke it), the Managing Director would need 
to appeal to a “notwithstanding” clause in order to override the access limit.  The appeal would need to be 
formally presented to the Executive Board, which would then need to approve it.  Executive Board decision 
making would not be by consensus, but by up/down voting, and a supermajority would be required.  This 
exceptional access mechanism would allow the IMF to retain some flexibility while maintaining 
accountability. 
34 While the existence of preferred creditor status implies that no true credit risk exists, the occurrence of 
arrears in the past suggest that this approach is not entirely appropriate   The IMF (2004) disputes the need 
for credit-risk measures.   
35 The adoption of risk-based credit measures would be consistent with the same governance standards that 
are applied, for example, to U.S. domestic banks, vis-à-vis the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) Improvement Act (United States Congress 1991).  For example, the FDIC Improvement Act states 
that “accounting principles applicable to reports or statements to be filed…should ‘result in financial 
statements and reports of condition that accurately reflect  the capital of such institutions’” (Section 
37.a.1.A).  This means that “risk-based assessments” (Section 302) are required such that risk is assessed 
based upon “different categories and concentrations of assets” (Section 302.b.1.C.i.I) and  “the likely 
amount of any such loss” (Section 302.b.1.C.ii).  These measures should also take account of “the risks of 
non-traditional activities” (Section 302.b.1.C.iii).  As it currently stands, the  IMF does not meet the 
accounting standards of the FDIC. 
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rules.  It could also provide  useful metrics against which to judge managerial 
performance. 
 
Measuring the “success” of the Managing Director is less quantitatively tractable than the 
access limits and risk measures described above.  Nevertheless, measuring the 
performance of the Managing Director in achieving program aims would be a key part of 
the  Board’s oversight role.  For example, the Board would examine whether the 
Managing Director and the staff had correctly assessed the nature of a particular crisis 
through its surveillance function (that is, was the crisis local or systemically important), 
provided correct policy advice, and delivered a program that ultimately promoted the 
IMF’s objectives without distorting private agents’ behaviour.   
 
The advantages of implementing a constrained discretion framework are clear:  the 
objectives of the IMF would be set by the Executive Board, and then implemented by the 
Managing Director and the staff.  The Executive Board would no longer make decisions 
by consensus; rather, transparent up/down voting would ensure accountability at their 
level of decision making.  The delineation between the policies set out by the Executive 
Board and their implementation by the Managing Director would further enhance 
governance, since  responsibility  could be attributed  accordingly.  Overall, t he 
combination of clearly defined objectives, responsibilities, operational rules, and 
transparency in how these rules are defined (through up/down voting) would greatly 
enhance the credibility and effectiveness of the IMF.  This is due to the fact that, under 
this form of constrained discretion, the benefits and costs of policy design and 
implementation would be more fully internalized by the appropriate level of policy- 
maker. 
 
8.  Conclusion 
 
The governance structure of the IMF was designed for an institution that would help to 
prevent, mitigate, and resolve the disruptions associated with balance-of-payments crises 
by  offering  temporary financing  to a club of sufficiently homogeneous borrowers.  
Importantly, since its members could expect to be on either side of the balance sheet, the 
incentives of the  IMF’s members were closely aligned.  Consequently,  consensus 
decision making and the close interaction of the Executive Board and the  Managing 
Director constituted a governance structure that was well suited to the IMF’s tasks. 
 
However, the world has changed considerably since the end of the Bretton Woods era.  
The small club of 44 countries has been superseded by a 184-member organization that 
includes both the richest and poorest countries in the world.  The IMF now operates in a 
world of flexible exchange rates and highly integrated and sophisticated global capital 
markets, and has subsequently become a long-term lender to a group of serial borrowers.  
This evolution has coincided with the emergence of a distinct group of IMF creditors 
(developed countries) and IMF borrowers (emerging-market and developing countries), 
and countries that have flexible exchange rates and those that have fixed exchange rates, 
respectively.  
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The governance challenges of the IMF are numerous: voice, representation, transparency, 
accountability, program ownership, the enforcement of conditionality, and exceptional 
access limits, to name a few.  While many of these issues are important, this paper has 
focused on the governance challenges with respect to the decision-making process of the 
IMF.  I would suggest that even if the quota issue were to be resolved to the satisfaction 
of the IMF’s membership, this would not necessarily mitigate the governance challenges 
confronting the IMF. 
  
The IMF’s decision-making process suffers from two potential governance failures: first, 
minority shareholders  may  have difficulty in resisting the actions of a controlling 
shareholder, and second, shareholders may have difficulty in resisting the initiatives that 
the Managing Director infers from the often heterogeneous interests of the Executive 
Board.  While these governance issues are important, they are only  parts of a larger 
challenge to IMF governance: the problem of accountability.  The source of this lack of 
accountability lies within the consensus model of decision making, and the close working 
relationship between the Managing Director and the Executive Board.  Moreover, the 
governance structure itself does not follow corporate best practice and renders internal 
change unlikely.   
 
I recognize that instituting governance reform will be d ifficult given the challenges 
described above.  Nevertheless, reforms are still possible.  I propose to mitigate the 
governance problems  of the  IMF through  the implementation of a modified form of 
constrained discretion.  Under constrained discretion, the Executive Board would set out 
the objectives of the IMF, and the constraints under which it must operate.     
 
Given the objectives and constraints set out by the Executive Board, the Managing 
Director and the staff would be free to use their “discretion” to achieve their goals.  Much 
like the governor of a central bank operating under constrained discretion, the Managing 
Director would be free to pursue their goal with the tools they have been given.
36  
Constrained discretion would thus ensure that the Managing Director would not deviate 
substantively from the limits imposed by the Executive Board.  A fundamental part of the 
implementation of constrained discretion would be the removal of the Executive Board 
from the day-to-day operation of the IMF.  Rather than sitting in a continuous session, the 
Board would meet only intermittently.  For instance, the policy objective and constraints 
would be set yearly and the performance of the IMF reviewed quarterly.  The advantage 
of separating the function of the Executive Board from the Managing Director is that 
accountability becomes more straightforward.  Changes in the objectives and constraints 
would be directly attributable to the Executive Board, and the subsequent responsibility 
for policy implementation successes and failures would be assigned to the Managing 
                                                 
36 Some critics have raised concerns that an independent Managing Director would have too much 
discretion, that too much responsibility would rest on one decision maker, and that small committees are 
often more effective than individual decision makers.  I would argue that the actions of the Managing 
Director would be constrained by the rules set by the Executive Board.  Also, the Managing Director would 
have the assistance of senior managers in making decisions.  
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Director.  Also, the fiduciary duty of the Executive Board would be clarified – to ensure 
that the Managing Director is adhering to the constraints set out by the Executive Board.  
 
This paper made clear the argument that the IMF’s membership and program lending has 
changed dramatically since the end of the Bretton Woods era.  Owing to these changes, 
the IMF’s governance structure, as inherited from 1944, may not be appropriate given its 
changing role.  The governance reforms suggested in this paper rest on the assumption 
that the current activities are the proper role for the IMF, and will remain so for the near 
future.  The larger question that needs to be raised is whether these modest reforms will 
be appropriate given the role of the IMF in 2010.   Simply, should the IMF continue its 
surveillance and program lending function, or are more radical changes needed for the 
future?  For instance, many have argued that the IMF needs to take a leading role in 
surveillance of the international monetary system, particularly with respect to multilateral 
exchange rate surveillance.  However, if the  IMF wishes to fulfill this role as an 
“umpire,” it will need to be impartial and independent of political interference.  More 
generally, in order for the  IMF to remain an effective international institution, its 
members must feel that the policies decided upon and implemented are consistent with 
the best economic analysis available, and not the result of an overly politicized decision- 
making process.  The aim of this paper has been to highlight these governance 
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Appendix: Gompers, Ishi, and Metrick (2003) 
Governance Index 
 
Subindex 1: Delay 
 
Provision 1: Classified (Staggered) Board – are directors placed into different classes and 
do they serve overlapping terms?  Average: 59.4 per cent.   
IMF Provision: There are different classes of directors and they are staggered.  The 
largest five members by quota appoint their Executive Directors.  For the rest, elections 
are held every two years, but IMF Board members are replaced at the discretion of the 
country groupings.  Therefore, Directors may be staggered. Governance Index Score = 1.     
 
Provision 2: Special meeting limitations – shareholder meetings require additional levels 
of support.  Average: 34.5 per cent.   
IMF Provision: A meeting requires the votes of fifteen members with 25 per cent of the 
voting power.  A quorum is obtained only when a majority of the Governors with 2/3 of 
the voting power agree.  Governance Index Score = 1.    
 
Provision 3: Written consent – the need for unanimous consent.  Average: 33.1 per cent.   
IMF Provision: IMF has no such provisions.  However, the consensus decision-making 
model implies that unanimity is achieved for all IMF decisions.  Nevertheless, I assume 
that unanimous consent is not needed.  Governance Index Score = 0.   
Subindex 2: Protection 
 
Provision 4: Director Indemnification Contracts – are directors immune to prosecution 
and lawsuits from shareholders, and will they have their legal fees covered?  Average: 
24.4 per cent.   
IMF Provision: Articles state explicitly that directors are immune from “legal process” 
in carrying out their official duties (Article IX, Section 8 (i)), unless waived by the IMF. 
Governance Index Score = 1.   
 
Provision 5: Liability – limits on directors’ personal liability for breaches of duty of care 
(duty of loyalty).  Average: 46.8 per cent.   
IMF Provision: IMF Directors and top managers are not personally liable. Governance 
Index Score = 1.   
 
Provision 6: Severance – assurance of position of executives does not depend on changes 
in control.   Average: 11.7 per cent.   
IMF Provision: Executive Board has the power to appoint and dismiss the Managing 
Director.  Changes in authorities’ governments are not correlated to changes in Managing 
Directors.  Governance Index Score = 0.   
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Subindex 3: Voting 
 
Provision 7: “Bylaw and Charter” measures the limitations on shareholders’ ability to 
amend the governing amendments of the corporation.  In practice, are supermajorities 
required or can the directors amend bylaws without shareholder approval?  Average:   
18.1 per cent.   
IMF Provision: Qualified or “super” majorities are required on over 50 IMF decisions.  
This includes decisions on most other  major governance issues.  Supermajorities are 
typically 70 to 85 per cent. Governance Index Score = 1.   
 
Provision  8: Lack of Secret Ballot: confidential voting is considered a positive for 
governance.  Average: 9.4 per cent.   
IMF Provision: Most decision making is done by informal consensus, which implies a 
weak form of secret voting. Governance Index Score = 0.5.   
  
Provision 9: Supermajority – are supermajorities required?  Average: 34.1 per cent.   
IMF Provision: Supermajorities of 85 per cent or 70 per cent are required for most IMF 
business.  Governance Index Score = 1.   
 
Provision 10: Unequal voting rights  – are some shareholders limited in their voting 
rights?  Average: 1.9 per cent.   
IMF Provision: Small countries that belong to country groupings a re not directly 
represented, and therefore are represented only by the largest country.  The misalignment 
of voting rights and quota from actual economic importance suggests that some 
shareholders have disproportionately more voting rights than others.  For instance, 
Canada and China have the same share of voting rights, but China’s GDP in PPP terms is 
six times larger than Canada’s, and at market exchange rates is 60 per cent larger.  
Governance Index Score = 1.   
Subindex 4: Other 
 
Provision 11: Directors’ Duties – do the provisions allow directors to consider the needs 
of constituents (such as private bond holders) other than shareholders?  This allows 
directors to reject decisions that may have been beneficial to shareholders in favour of the 
constituency.   Average: 4.4 per cent.   
IMF Provision: Executive Directors are ultimately not accountable to all shareholders, 
only to their country authorities.  Country authorities may have preferences regarding 
outside constituents.  The process of consensus decision making renders accountability 
problematic, since decisions cannot be attributed specifically to individual directors. 
Governance Index Score = 1.   
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